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BOOK REVIEW 
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE WORLD. 
BY \VERNER FELD. Englewood Cliffs, N. ]. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1967. Pp. 183. $2.45. 
John I. C ostonis t 
The foreign relations provisions of the Rome Treaty, the charter 
of the European Economic Community (EEC),1 have occasioned 
enthusiastic comment t hroughout the first decade of the Community's 
existence.2 They appear on their face to e ndow the EEC with powers 
over external relations that significantly outpace those of other inter­
national organizations.3 Under these provisions the EEC may enter 
into tariff ,4 commercial,5 and association 6 accords with outside states 
and international organizations, and establish other "needful" ties with 
the latter groupings.7 In addition, the foreign relations provisions 
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, Harvard 
University. LL.B. 1965, Columbia University. Member, D.C. Bar. 1 There are three European Communities : the European Coal and Steel Com­
munity (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Respectively, they were established under 
the ECSC Treaty, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; the Euratom Treaty, March 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958; and the EEC Treaty, March 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958. Throughout this review, 
references to the "Community" and to the "Rome Treaty" or "Treaty" should be 
understood to designate the EEC and the EEC Treaty. All quotations from the EEC 
Treaty are from the unofficial translation provided by the Publishing Services of the 
European Communities. 
2 Representative appraisals include, e.g., Dupuy, Du Charactere Unitaire de la 
Communaiute Economique Europeenne Dans Ses Relations Exterieures, 1963 ANN. 
FRAN. DR. INTL. 779; Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for the 
Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEX L. REV. 891 (1965); G. GIARDINA, CoMMUNITA 
EUROPEE E STAT! TERzI (1964); Megret, Le Pouvoir de la Comm1mauti Economique 
Europeene des Accords Internationaux, 1964 R.M.C. 529; Pescatore, Les relations 
exterieures des Communaut.es Europeennes, 103 R.Ec. DES CouRs 134 (1961) [herein­
after cited as Pescatore] ; P. RAux, LES RELATIONS ExTERIEURS DE LA CoMMUNAUTE 
EcoNOMIQUE EuROPEENNE ( 1966). 
s For a careful comparison of the treaty-making powers of the EEC with those of 
other international organizations, see Pescatore 53-67. For a treatment of the treaty­
making powers of international organizations generally, see, e.g., Dupuy, Le Droit 
des Relations entre Les Organizations, 100 REC. DES CoURS 461 (1960); Parry, Treaty­
Making Power of the United Nations, 26 B.Y.I.L. 108 (1949); J. SCHNEIDER, TREATY­
MAKING PowER oF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1959); H. SocrNI, GLI AccoRDI 
INTERNAZIONALI DELLE 0RGANIZZAZIONI lNTERGOVERNATIVE (1963). 
4 EEC Treaty art 111. 
5 EEC Treaty art 113. 
6 EEC Treaty art. 238. 
7 EEC Treaty art. 229-31. See also, id. art. 230, 231. 
(1314) 
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charge the Community with administering a common external tariff 
for third-state imports into the six member states,8 with developing a 
common commercial policy governing patterns of trade between the Six 
and the outside world,3 and with coordinating the positions of the 
member states in other international economic organizations in which 
they participate.10 
Notably, these provisions seem to assign to the Community organs 
a role of partnership with, if not dominance over, the member states in 
discharging these responsibilities. Particularly striking in this respect 
are the procedural rules established by article 228 for the exercise of 
the Community's treaty-making powers.1� The charters of the few 
other international organizations that possess a foreign relations 
competence generally assign only the negotiating function to the inter­
governmental organ and require the approval of the national parliaments 
of member states as  a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the 
negotiated accord.12 In contrast, article 228 confers overwhelming 
responsibility for conducting the EEC treaty-making function upon the 
Community organs, leaving the member states with a seemingly 
marginal role in this area. Naming the EEC Commission-the organ 
charged with furthering the "general interest" of the Community 13-
as the negotiator of Community accords, article 228 also provides that 
these accords directly bind the member states upon conclusion by the 
EEC Council. In addition, the article requires the Council to consult 
s EEC Treaty art. 18-29. 
9 EEC Treaty art. 111-16. 
10 EEC Treaty art. 116. 
11 EEC Treaty art. 228 provides : 
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between 
the Community and one or more States or an international organization, such 
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers 
conferred upon the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be con­
cluded by the Council after the Assembly has been consulted in the cases pro­
vided for by this Treaty. 
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may, as a preliminary, 
obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to the compatability of the con­
templated agreements with the provisions of this Treaty. An agreement which 
is the subject of a negative opinion of the Court of Justice may only enter 
into force under the conditions laid down, according to the case concerned, in 
Article 236. 
2: Agreements concluded under the conditions laid down above shall be binding 
on the institutions of the Community and on the Member States. 
12 See, e.g., EFT A Treaty art. 41-2, which provides: 
The Council may negotiate an agreement between the Member States and 
any other State, union of States or international organization, creating an 
association embodying such reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions 
and special procedures as may be necessary or appropriate. Such an agree­
ment shall be submitted to the Member States for acceptance and shall enter 
into force provided that it is accepted by all the Member States. Instruments 
of acceptance shall be deposited with the Gov.errunent of Sweden which shall 
notify all other Member States. 
(Emphasis added). See generally, authorities cited in note 3 supra. 
13 EEC Treaty art. 157-2. 
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with the European Parliament prior to concluding association accords 
and empowers the Community Court to pass on the compatibility of 
a proposed accord with the Rome Treaty. Article 228, in conjunction 
with articles 236 and 238, restricts the participation of the member 
states as such in the Community treaty-making process to requesting a 
Community Court ruling on the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with 
a proposed accord and to amending that Treaty to cure any incompati­
bility declared to exist by the Court. 
Writing some three years after the formation of the EEC, Pro­
fessor Pescatore, presently a member of the Community Court, ap­
praised the Community's treaty-making provisions as a "veritable 
transfer of powers to the Community in the domain of external rela­
tions." 14 In the same study he concluded that "in the sphere prescribed 
by the Treaty, it is the Community which from now on will act in the 
place and service of the States, and it is the [Community] which will 
bind the States by its undertakings." 15 In the absence of substantial 
Community practice under the relevant Treaty provisions, Professor 
Pescatore's projections were largely based upon an analysis of the 
bare texts of the Rome Treaty and the underlying political and 
economic objectives of that document. 
The months and years following Professor Pescatore's appraisal 
have provided a rich vein of material for students of the Community's 
foreign relations powers. Invoking article 238, the Community con­
cluded association agreements with Greece, Turkey, a group of eighteen 
African states (most of which were former French and Belgian 
colonies) and Nigeria.16 Utilizing its powers under article 111 to 
negotiate tariff accords with third states and groups of states, the 
Community participated in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of t ariff 
bargaining in the GA TT, and concluded bilateral tariff accords with 
Israel and Iran.17 In addition, it has completed negotiations with 
Lebanon on a commercial accord under article 113 entailing an ex­
change of tariff concessions and the provision of technical assistance by 
14 Pescatore 134. 
15 Id. 
16 The Community has contracted the following association accords under article 
238: Accord Creating an Association Between the EEC and Greece, [1963] E.E.C.J.O. 
294 [hereinafter cited as the Greek accord]; Acco�d Creat�ng an Association Between 
the EEC and Turkey,. [l.964] E.E.C.J.O. 3687 [heremafter c1t�d as the T urkish accord]; 
Convention of Association Between the EEC and the African and Malagasy States 
Associate d  with this Community, [1964] E.E.C.J.O. 1431 [hereinafter cited as the 
Yaounde accord] ; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the EEC and 
the Republic of Nigeria, 1966 lNT'L LEG. MAT. 828-58 (unratified) [hereinafter cited 
as the Nigerian accord] .  
17 Tariff accords that have been concluded at the time of writing (February 1968) 
include the Commercial Accord between the EEC and the State of Israel 
'
[1964] 
E E C  J.O. 1518; Commercial Accord between the EEC and the Imperial Go�ernment 
0£° I�a� [1963] E.E.C.J.O. 2555; the "Dillon Round" agreement entered into by the 
EEC w'ith the partners of the Six in GA TT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
July 16, 1962, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2889, �.l.A.S . No. 5253; and the "Kennedy Round" 
agreement entered into on the same basis, see Le Monde, 1 Jul. 1967, at 17. 
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the Six to bolster the Lebanese economic development program.18 In 
its first decade, the Community has also established numerous tics with 
international organizations 19 and has taken important steps in the 
design and implementation of a common commercial policy linking 
the Six with the outside world in economic matters.20 
Though unavailable to Pescatore a s  a source for his appraisal of 
the EEC's foreign relations powers, the Community practice described 
above provided a basis upon which subsequent commentators could 
re-evaluate his earlier conclusions. Later writers too, however, have 
largely restricted themselves to the bare text of the Treaty and to 
general principles and, not surprisingly, have arrived at even more 
enthusiastic conclusions. 
By ignoring Community practice as a clue to the scope of the 
Community's foreign relations powers, the commentators have left many 
serious questions unresolved. One notable deficiency in the literature 
is the absence of any systematic consideration of the extent to which 
the Treaty texts have in fact been interpreted to facilitate the "transfer 
of powers to the Community in the domain of external relations" pro­
jected by Pescatore. Is the Community master, servant or equal 
partner of the member states in the conduct of EEC foreign relations? 
Again, the articles themselves abound with fundamental gaps and 
ambiguities. Only Community practice can serve to complete the 
faltering or purposefully vague work of the Treaty's framers. It is 
that practice, for example, which will establish the content of the EEC's 
"common commercial policy" and the permissible scope of a Community 
"association accord," as those terms a r e  used in articles 111 and 238 
respectively. 
Failure to examine the administrative machinery that has been 
devised for managing Community foreign relations has Jeft obscure 
the relative contributions of the Community organs, the member govern­
ments, and national and Community-level private groups. To what 
extent, for example, is the EEC Commission subject to pressures from 
these sources when it negotiates tariff and commercial accords of broad 
economic import? Furthermore, the formalistic inquiries of the com­
mentators have not illuminated the emerging contours of the economic 
and political objectives which guide the exercise of the Community's 
foreign relations powers. What policies influence the Community's 
18 The EEC has successfully completed negotiations on an accord with Lebanon. 
See the Accord on Commercial Exchanges and Technical Cooperation Between the 
EEC and the Member States, on one side, and the Lebanon Republic, on the other, 
1965 INT'L LEG. MAT. 728-32. 
19 The Community has not published a schedule of its agreements with interna­
tional organizations. It is known, however, that it has entered into agreements with 
the International Labor Organization, see [1959] E.E.C.J.O. 521, and with UNESCO, 
see 8 GEN. REP. 305 ( 1965) . A summary of the Community's relations with inter­
national organizations during 1967 may be found at 10 GEN. REP. 378-81, 401-04 (1967). 
20 See Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy iii the Euro­
pean Economic Community, 4 COM. MAR. L. REV. 141 (1966). 
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relations with the United States, the "Outer Seven," the Communist 
bloc countries and the developing nations of Latin America, Africa and 
Asia? To what extent do those policies reflect Community autonomy 
in the exercise of its foreign relations powers? 
In The European Common Market and the World,21 Professor 
Werner Feld has taken a giant step past existing appraisals of the 
Community's foreign relations powers by rooting his study firmly in 
the soil of a decade of Community foreign relations practice. The 
holder of degrees in law as well as in political science, Feld does not 
minimize the significance of Treaty texts and other formal commit­
ments of the member states as determinants of the scope of the Com­
munity's foreign relations powers. On the contrary, the introduction 
and first chapter of the study contain a comprehensive analysis of the 
guidelines found in the Treaty and in general international law for the 
exercise of these powers. But Feld also recognizes that the evolution 
of independent Community control over its external relations threatens 
entrenched governmental and private interests at the member state 
level. Sensitive to the impact of these institutional stresses upon the 
manner in which the formal texts have been interpreted, Feld probes 
many of the issues that have been largely ignored by previous com­
mentators. His use of interviews, questionnaires and other empirical 
techniques further sharpens his exploration of these issues. Thanks to 
Feld's balanced perspective and disciplined investigative methods, the 
reader comes away from The European Common Market and the World 
with a sounder grasp of the gap between textual promise and actual 
performance, the manner in which ambiguities in the Treaty text have 
been resolved by hard practical decisions, and the intricate adminis­
trative system that has been devised for the conduct of Community 
foreign relations. The reader is also instructed in the policies pursued 
by the Community in its dealings with the outside world. 
The format of the study reflects Feld's twin objectives: portray­
ing the operation of the Community system in the elaboration of foreign 
relations policies, and setting forth the content of these policies with 
regard to different areas of the world. The book has two parts, the 
first pursuing the former objective, the second the latter. As noted 
above, the legal basis for Community involvement in external relations 
activity is recorded in the introduction and first chapter. The next 
three chapters deal in turn with the relative roles and contributions of 
the Community organs, the six national administrations, and the 
private, national, and Community-level elites in the . formulation of 
Community policy. In Part II, Feld treats successively the Com­
munity's relations with European non-.member s�ates, non-Europ� 
"ndustrialized free-world states, developing countries, and Communist 1
t t s He concludes the study by speculating about the likely shape s a e .  
21 (1967). 
19681 BOOK REVIEW 1319 
of future Community foreign relations policies, particularly as they 
relate to the United States, and about the probable role of the Com­
munity organs in their formulation and execution. 
Professor Feld's treatment of the economic and political dimensions 
of his subject is skillful and persuasive. To this reader, however, 
Feld's most valuable contribution is his systematic, empirical appraisal 
of the respective roles of the C ommunity organs and the member states 
in the formulation and execution of Community foreign relations 
policies. Summarizing his findings, Feld concludes: 
As far as the making of external Community policy is 
concerned, the member governments generally appear to 
have been the masters controlling this process and to have 
used the EEC and the external policy instrumentalities it 
offers for their own purposes. On the other hand, the EEC, 
acting as a unit through the Commission, so far has had only 
limited success in directing how national economic policies are 
to serve the Community interest. With the exception of mat­
ters affecting the [common external tariff] or [common 
agricultural policy] levies, the member governments have 
largely chosen when to use EEC or national policies for the 
pursuit of their foreign economic policy objectives. They have 
determined the form and substance of the EEC policies. They 
have closely controlled and supervised the activities of the 
Commission when negotiating with third countries, permitting 
the Commission only a minimum of discretion. And they 
have controlled to a large extent the execution of policies, 
although the Commission, as guardian of the Community 
interest, could admonish or even complain to the Community 
Court in case of Treaty violation. In fact, however, the Com­
mission has been primarily the servant of the member govern­
ments, collecting statistics, compiling information, coming 
forth with ideas and suggestions, and elaborating recom­
mendations for the reconciliation of the divergent interests of 
the member states, but really not having more than an oblique 
influence on the final deliberations and judgments of the 
member governments. Other Community organs, such as 
the Parliament . . . , which also have been assigned roles 
in the external policy making process, have been even less 
influential than the Commission.22 
These conclusions will touch off spirited debate among EEC 
scholars. They clash with the seeming import of the treaty provisions 
which, like article 228, accord the Community organs a dominant role 
22w. FELD, TaE EuRoPEAN CoMMoN MARKET AND THE WoRLo 162-63 (1967). 
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in the formulation and pursuit of EEC external policy. They challenge 
the consensus, among Community students regarding the purportedly 
innovative nature of the EEC's powers in the international organiza­
tions field. And they do not seem to square with the Community's 
record of accomplishment over the last decade as measured by the num­
ber and significance of its international agreements and its initial steps 
in constructing a common commercial policy. 
But this writer is convinced of the essential soundness of Feld's 
position. The member states have in fact been successful in systemat­
ically paring down the foreign relations prerogatives seemingly granted 
the Community under the Rome Treaty. This generalization applies 
with dramatic force to the stunted evolution of the Community's treaty­
making power, a subject of special interest to the writer.23 As we have 
seen, article 228 allocates responsibility for the conduct of the Com­
munity treaty-making process among the Council, Commission, Euro­
pean Parliament and Community Court, and virtually excludes the 
member states as such from a significant role in this process. But how 
has article 228 been applied over the last decade? Though designated 
as the Community organ that "negotiates" EEC accords, the Com­
mission has been little more than the Council's agent or plenipotentiary 
in treaty negotiations.24 The Parliament's influence has virtually been 
eliminated by the Council's insistence that the former body be con­
sulted after rather than before signature of Community accords.25 And 
the Court has yet to pronounce on the compatibility of a Community 
accord with the Rome T reaty, although seven 26 of the Community's 
nine accords 27 directly confronted the Community with this difficult 
issue. 
The obvious beneficiary of the reduced influence of these Com­
munity bodies is the Council and, through it, the member states them­
selves. Let it not be thought, however, that the shift of control to the 
Council has been fortuitous. On the contrary, the members of the 
Council-themselves under instruction from their home governments­
have engineered the shift through two basic techniques. First, they 
have narrowly interpreted key provisions of the Rome Treaty to enlarge 
the residual treaty-making powers of the member states at the expense 
of the delegated powers of the Community. In doing so, of course, 
they have displaced the Community Court as the arbiter of the scope 
of the EEC's treaty-making power, a circumstance that goes far toward 
23 See Costonis, The Treaty-Making Power of the Eitropean Economic Com­
munity: The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 CoM. MAR. L. REV. - (March, 1968). 
24 W. FELD, supra note 19, at 163. 
25 See, e.g., Report, Eur. Par!. Doc. No. 61, 18 Sept. 1961; Report, Eur. Parl. 
Doc. No. 94, 25 Nov. 1963. 
2'6 The accords in question are the Greek, Turkish, Yaounde and Nigerian asso­
ciation accords, the Dillon and Kennedy Round tariff accords and the Lebanon com­
mercial accord. 
21 See notes 16-19 supra. 
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explaining why the Court's jurisdiction under article 228 has not been 
exercised since the Community's inception. The technique of narrowly 
construing the delegated treaty powers also legitimates direct member­
state intervention in the "Community" treaty-making process. The 
states have been quick to grasp the opportunity. Their representatives 
have participated as "national observers" in most of the Community 
negotiating sessions. Furthermore, their executives and national 
parliaments have signed and ratified each Community accord adjudged 
by the Council to exceed the Community's competence. 
In addition to construing the Rome Treaty narrowly, the Council 
has carefully constructed the administrative machinery for the conduct 
of Community treaty-making activity to guarantee a dominant role to 
the member states. Professor Feld provides an excellent description 
of this machinery in chapters 2 and 4 of his book. One might wish, 
however, that he had given greater emphasis to the intimate relation­
ship between the Treaty's construction and the choice of administrative 
mechanisms. Only by making the threshold determination that a given 
matter touches upon a residual competence of the member states can 
the Council legitimate direct member-state intervention in the Com­
munity foreign relations process. 
Is the existing trend irreversible? Feld thinks not. The develop­
ment of a single internal market within the Community, he speculates, 
may generate pressures on the member states to relax their grip on 
the formulation and execution of concomitant external relations activi­
ties. Evidence of this possibility may be found in the agricultural field: 
as the Community accedes to greater control over internal Community 
agricultural policies, the member states have tended t o  concede it a 
greater role in shaping external policies in this area. Feld also con­
jectures that the member states may agree to coordinate their over-all 
foreign relations policies outside the framework of the Treaty and the 
Community. While this step may eliminate conflicts among the mem­
ber states, however, he properly questions whether it will lead to a 
strengthened role for the Community. 
Two other factors not explicitly treated by Feld may also portend 
an increased foreign relations role for the Community during the next 
decade. One is the growth of a habit of cooperation among the Six 
resulting from their efforts to coordinate national viewpoints within a 
Community framework each time a Community accord or external 
relations policy is debated in the Council. It cannot be doubted, of 
course, that considerably more than this habit and the machinery devised 
to implement it is necessary to effectuate a meaningful transfer of 
foreign relations powers to the Community. At the same time, how­
ever, the Community's existence is now a political fact which none 
of the member governments can easily disregard. To do so might 
antagonize the other members or, worse still, dissipate the greater 
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political leverage vis-a-vis third states that may accrue to a member 
country through coordinated six-nation action. 
An even more important factor has been highlighted by Walter 
Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission, in his farewell 
address to the European Parliament: 
Europe feels deeply that her form of life today is pro­
foundly inadequate. She continues to suffer gravely from the 
gap between the vocation powerfully rooted in sentiment that 
Europe has qualities that call her to assume a fundamental 
responsibility in world politics and the inability to regroup 
her resources and organize them to be able to fulfill this 
vocation. This is the true reason for the European malaise 
of which so much has been said.28 
From hardened Gaullists to committed Eurocrats, the undesirability 
if not danger of the Six remaining fragmented in a world of super­
powers is uniformly recognized. Whether the issues concern measures 
of defense to deal with a feared United States economic imperium and 
technical superiority, or the adoption of bargaining positions on tariff, 
monetary or development aid questions before international organiza­
tions, the leverage of the Six is immeasurably increased if they proceed 
on the basis of  a truly common policy. The rub, of course, is that in 
pursuing policies orchestrated and directed at the Community level, 
the member nations surrender pro tanto their control over the conduct 
of their own external relations. Although the advantages of common 
action have been widely extolled i n  the first decade of the Community's 
existence, they have not proven sufficiently attractive to counter the 
regressive forces that have stifled the evolution of the Community's 
treaty-making powers. But they could easily prove overpowering 
should the next decade see a substantial increase in the pressures on 
the Six generated by international economic competition and a decrease 
in the hold that nationalism-whether strident or covert-exerts over 
the behavior of the member states within the Community. 
This review commenced with a summary of a number of central 
issues that students of the Community's foreign relations powers have 
tended to overlook. It would be too much, of course, to expect that a 
single volume could remedy omissions of such long standing. In 
The European Common Market and the World, Professor Feld has 
nevertheless taken remarkable strides toward illuminating much that 
was previously obscure. More important, perhaps, his volume con­
stitutes a model of disciplined inquiry and thoughtful analysis· that 
places all students of Community affairs in his debt. 
28 Speech of Professor Walter Hallstein to the European Parliament, 21 June 1967. 
